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Abstract
This paper studies secure implementability [Saijo, T., T. Sjöström, and T.Yamato (2007), “Secure 
Implementation,” Theoretical Economics 2, pp.203-229] on the provision of one discrete and 
excludable public good with cost shares. Our main result shows that only constant social choice 
functions are securely implementable in standard quasi-linear environments.
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1  Introduction
Secure implementability, introduced by Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato (2007), is a solution concept in 
implementation theory.1 This requires that there exists a mechanism where (i) each dominant strategy 
equilibrium induces socially optimal outcome and (ii) each Nash equilibrium also induces socially 
optimal outcome, that is, double implementability in dominant strategy equilibria and Nash equilibria.2 
This concept is considered to be a benchmark of constructing mechanisms working well in laboratory 
experiments.3
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1 See Jackson (2001) and Maskin and Sjöström (2002) for implementation theory.
2 See Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato (2007) for a formal definition of secure implementability and the motivation for 
secure implementation. See also Mizukami and Wakayama (2007) and Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato (2007) for a 
characterization of dominant strategy implementable social choice functions and Maskin (1977) for a characterization 
of Nash implementable social choice functions.
3 See Cason, Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato (2006) for an experimental result on secure implementation.
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Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato (2007) characterize securely implementable social choice functions 
by strategy-proofness, which is a necessary condition for dominant strategy implementation, and the 
rectangular property (Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato, 2007), which is a stronger condition than non-
bossiness (Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein, 1981).4 Strategy-proofness requires that the truthful 
revelation is a weakly dominant strategy for each agent in the direct revelation mechanism associated 
with the social choice function. This concept is a standard incentive property in social choice theory.5 
The rectangular-property requires that if each agent cannot change his utility by his revelation, then 
the outcome cannot change by the all agents’ revelation in the direct revelation mechanism associated 
with the social choice function. In direct revelation mechanism associated with a social choice 
function satisfying strategy-proofness, the rectangular property requires that if each agent has a best 
response which is different from truthful revelation, then the outcome induced by Nash equilibrium 
associated with such best responses coincides with the one induced by truthful revelations.
In the previous literature, secure implementability is considered in some environments: single-
peaked voting environments (Berga and Moreno, 2009; Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato, 2007), public 
good economies (Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato, 2007), production economies (Kumar, 2009), allotment 
economies (Bochet and Sakai, 2010), Shapley-Scarf housing markets (Fujinaka and Wakayama, 
2010), and the assignment of indivisible and private goods with monetary transfers (Fujinaka and 
Wakayama, 2008).6 Unfortunately, almost all of these studies show negative results, that is, there 
is rarely non-trivial securely implementable social choice function. On receiving these results, it is 
interesting to investigate which environments have non-trivial securely implementable social choice 
functions. This paper studies such a problem.
This paper is closely related to two papers written by Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato (2007) and 
Fujinaka and Wakayama (2008). Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato (2007) consider the provision of one 
discrete and non-excludable public good with cost shares. They show that when each agent has a 
quasi-linear utility function with a concave valuation function, there is no securely implementable and 
surplus-maximizing social choice function.7 In our model, we consider the provision of one discrete 
and excludable public good with cost shares. Examples of such provisions include public facilities 
(e.g. highways and museums) and public services (e.g. train, bus, and plane services per hour) as 
long as they are not congested. Information goods (e.g. software and audio-visual contents) and 
intellectual properties (e.g. patented technologies and copyrighted pieces) are also included in such 
examples. Theoretically, we have more strategy-proof social choice functions in excludable public 
good economies than non-excludable public good economies.8 Moreover, we require each agent’s 
4 See Mizukami and Wakayama (2008) for an alternative characterization of securely implementable social choice 
functions in terms of a version of monotonicity (Maskin, 1977).
5 See Barberà (2010) for social choice theory related to strategy-proofness.
6 See also Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato (2003) for examples of non-secure direct revelation mechanisms.
7 If the social choice function is surplus-maximizing, then it maximizes the sum of each agents’ valuations of the public 
good.
8 See Deb and Razzolini (1999), Moulin (1994), and Ohseto (2000) for examples of strategy-proof social choice 
functions in excludable public good economies.
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valuation functions of strict concavity and strict increasingness.9 In such a model, we characterize 
securely implementable social choice functions. Fujinaka and Wakayama (2008) consider the 
assignment of indivisible and private goods with monetary transfers. They show that when each 
agent has a quasi-linear utility function and the set of profiles of valuation functions of private goods 
satisfies minimal richness (Fujinaka and Wakayama, 2008), only constant social choice functions are 
securely implementable. Theoretically, our model is different from theirs, so our result is not obvious. 
However, our approach is similar to theirs.
In this paper, we characterize the class of securely implementable social choice functions in 
our model: when each agent has a quasi-linear utility function with a strictly concave and strictly 
increasing valuation function, the social choice function is securely implementable if and only if 
it is constant. This result is stronger than the result of Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato (2007) since 
each agent’s utility functions are more restrictive in our model than theirs and our result is the 
characterization of securely implementable social choice functions in discrete and excludable public 
good economies. 
This paper is organized according to the following sections. In Section 2, our model is introduced. 
We define properties of social choice functions related to secure implementability in Section 3. Some 
preliminary results on these properties are shown in Section 4. In Section 5, we show our main result. 
Conclusion is in Section 6.
2  Model
Let  ( ) be a set of agents. Let  be a set of production levels of the 
public good and  be a cost function. For each , let  be consumption of the 
public good for agent . By excludability of the public good, we allow for  for some  
with . For each , let  be a cost share of the public good for agent . For each 
, let  be a consumption bundle for agent . Let 
be the set of feasible allocations.
For each , let  be a utility function for agent . We assume that for each 
, there exists , called a valuation function of the public good for agent , such 
that for each ,
We also assume that  is strictly concave and strictly increasing for each . For each , let  
be the set of all valuation functions of the public good for agent . Let  be the domain 
and  be a profile of valuation functions of the public good. For each , let 
 be a profile of valuation functions of the public 
9 Such requirements are standard in excludable public good economies except for quasi-linearity.
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good other than agent .
Let  be a social choice function. For each  and each , let  
be the consumption bundle for agent  associated with a social choice function  at .
3  Properties of Social Choice Functions
Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato (2007) introduce secure implementation that is identical with double 
implementation in dominant strategy equilibria and Nash equilibria. They show that the social choice 
function is securely implementable if and only if it satisfies strategy-proofness and the rectangular 
property (Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato, 2007). In this paper, we consider securely implementable 
social choice functions in our model.
Strategy-proofness requires that the truthful revelation is a weakly dominant strategy for each agent 
in the direct revelation mechanism associated with the social choice function.
Definition 1. The social choice function  satisfies strategy-proofness if for each  and each 
,
The rectangular-property requires that if each agent cannot change his utility by his revelation, then 
the allocation cannot change by the all agents’ revelation in the direct revelation mechanism associated 
with the social choice function.
Definition 2. The social choice function  satisfies the rectangular property if for each ,
4  Preliminary Results
In what follows, we show some preliminary results on strategy-proofness and the rectangular property 
in our model.
Remark 1. We have four lemmas in this section. Lemmas 1, 2, and 4 does not depend on any 
properties of valuation functions. Lemma 3 only depends on strict increasingness of valuation 
functions.
4.1 Strategy-Proofness
Lemma 1 shows that each agent’s cost shares of the public good depend on his consumption of the 
public good if the social choice function satisfies strategy-proofness.
Lemma 1. If the social choice function  satisfies strategy-proofness, then for each  and 
OSAKA ECONOMIC PAPERS Vol.61 No.2－ 52 －
each , 
Proof. Suppose, by contradiction, that there exist  and  such that  
and . If , then 
which is a contradiction to strategy-proofness. If , then 
which is a contradiction to strategy-proofness.  □
By Lemma 1, we have the following lemma immediately.
Lemma 2. If the social choice function  satisfies strategy-proofness, then for each  and 
each ,
Proof. Suppose, by contradiction, that there exist  and  such that 
 and . By Lemma 1, we have . 
This implies
which is a contradiction. □
Lemma 3 shows that the more each agent consumes the public good, the more he shares the cost of 
the public good if the social choice function satisfies strategy-proofness and his valuation functions of 
the public good are strictly increasing.
Lemma 3. If the social choice function  satisfies strategy-proofness, then for each  and 
each , 
Proof. Suppose, by contradiction, that there exist  and  such that  
and . Since  by strict increasingness of , 
we have 
which is a contradiction to strategy-proofness.  □
4.2 Rectangular Property
Lemma 4 shows that each agent’s consumption of the public good depends on his utility if the social 
choice function satisfies the rectangular property.10
10 This lemma holds even if the rectangular property is replaced by non-bossiness (Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato, 2007), 
which is weaker than the rectangular property. The social choice function  satisfies non-bossiness if for each 
 and each , 
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Lemma 4. If the social choice function  satisfies the rectangular property, then for each  
and each , 
Proof. Suppose, by contradiction, that there exist  and  such that 
  (1)
and . Let  be such that . For , since (1) 
holds and , we have
  (2)
For each , since , we have
  (3)
By (2), (3), and the rectangular property, we have . This implies , 
which is a contradiction to . □
5  Main Result
To show our main result, we introduce some definitions. For each  and each , let 
be the option set for agent  given , that is, the set of consumption of the public good that agent 
 can induce given . For each , each , and each , let
be the indifferent set for agent  with  at . Given , , and , 
we have  for each . Since  depends on  given 
 and , let
. See Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato (2007) for an alternative characterization of securely 
implementable social choice functions in terms of non-bossiness.
Figure 1 : The existence of v"i .
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The social choice function satisfies constancy if for each , .
Proposition 1. For each  and each , suppose that  is strictly concave and strictly 
increasing. The social choice function  satisfies strategy-proofness and the rectangular property if 
and only if it satisfies constancy.
Proof. Since it is obvious that  satisfies strategy-proofness and the rectangular property if  satisfies 
constancy, we show that  satisfies constancy if  satisfies strategy-proofness and the rectangular 
property.
Suppose, by contradiction, that there exist  such that . By the rectangular 
property, there exists  such that . 
By strategy-proofness, we have
By Lemma 2, we have . By Lemma 1, there exists  
corresponding to .
Suppose that . This implies that  is not empty 
since . Let 
By Lemma 1, there exists  corresponding to . Let 
.  By Lemma 1,  there  exis ts   corresponding to 
. Since all valuation functions for agent  are strictly concave and strictly increasing, 
there exists  such that
  (4)
  (5)
Notice that (5) is guaranteed by the definition of  and Lemma 3 since there is no 
consumption of the public good for agent  between  and , which is induced by 
herself and  holds if  (See Figure 1). By (4) and 
the definition of , we have
  (6)
By (5) and the definition of , we have
  (7)
By (6), (7), and strategy-proofness, we have  or . If 
, then, by (6), we have . 
This implies  by Lemma 4, which is a contradiction since . 
By the same argument, we have a contradiction if .
Suppose that . In this case, we define  as  
and have a contradiction by the same argument as the case of . □
Proposition 1 is tight: Example 1 shows that strategy-proofness is necessary for Proposition 1 and 
Example 2 shows that the rectangular property is necessary for Proposition 1.
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Example 1. Suppose that  and for each  and each , there exists  and 
 for each . Let  be such that for each ,  and for each 
,
We know that  satisfies the rectangular property but not strategy-proofness since the value of  
is determined by agent 1’s revelation alone and agent 1’s utility is monotonically increasing in his 
consumption of the public good, which is assigned by .
Example 2. Suppose the same environment as Example 1. Let  be such that for each , 
 and for  each ,  . 
We know that  satisfies strategy-proofness but not the rectangular property since each agent’s 
consumption bundle assigned by  depends on other agents’ revelation but does not change by her 
own revelation.
By Proposition 1 and a characterization of securely implementable social choice functions by Saijo, 
Sjöström, and Yamato (2007), we have the following constancy theorem of secure implementation.
Theorem 1. For each  and each , suppose that  is strictly concave and strictly 
increasing. The social choice function  is securely implementable if and only if it satisfies 
constancy.
6  Conclusion
In this paper, we consider secure implementability on the provision of one discrete and excludable 
public good with cost shares. Our main result shows that only constant social choice functions are 
securely implementable in standard quasi-linear environments. By applying the observations of Cason, 
Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato (2006), our main result suggests that almost all of strategy-proof direct 
revelation mechanisms do not work well in discrete and excludable public good economies.
This paper does not sufficiently investigate domain-richness conditions related to secure 
implementability. It is open to shed light on the maximal domain on which securely implementable 
social choice functions are constant.
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